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Abstract
We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design
of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro (2003)’s
consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs
an entry cost before engaging in a patent dispute, a more stringent settlement policy
of deterring costly entry is preferable to the patent-holder and may lead to higher
static efficiency. Concerning asymmetric information, when the disputants, but not
the court, learn the patent validity, we derive an “expectation test,” which requires
that a laxer settlement policy be coupled with higher expected patent validity under
settlement.
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1 Introduction
The settlement of patent disputes1 is a two-edged sword. It avoids uncertainty, saves
private litigation costs, and conserves judicial resources. It can also mask firms’ in-
tention to monopolize the market under settlement arrangements.2 How to properly
regulate settlements becomes even more difficult once we acknowledge that intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs) are state-created monopoly rights, and that very often
patent rights are probabilistic rather than ironclad (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).3
Consider a simple situation (adopted from Shapiro (2003)). A patent-holder serves
as a monopolist in a market thanks to her patent. To enter the market, a potential en-
trant needs to clear the patent barrier either by invalidating the patent or by earning
a court decision of no infringement. Alternatively, the two parties may wish to settle
the patent dispute in order to advance their joint interest. In this case (and assume
away secret dispute and settlement), the settlement agreement proposed by the dis-
putants has to be approved by the court or antitrust authority. For simplicity, suppose
that both parties as well as the court agree that, if fully tried, the patent-holder will
prevail (i.e., the patent will be valid and the potential entrant will be infringing) with
probability α ∈ [0, 1].
When α = 1, there is no doubt that the entrants infringes on a valid patent. By
the exclusive power granted by the patent law, the patent-holder is entitled to the
monopoly and thus any settlement that would confine the monopoly power within
the same market should be allowed,4 even if it exactly replicates the monopoly out-
come. By contrast, if α = 0, i.e., the patent is not valid or the potential entrant is
not infringing, then the economy shouldn’t suffer from the mere presence of an un-
warranted patent grant, and any settlement that would soften competition should be
1Or, more generally, the licensing of patent rights, as put in Shapiro (2003): “Virtually every patent license
can be viewed as a settlement of a patent dispute.”
2The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property states: “Antitrust concerns may arise when a licens-
ing arrangement harms competition among entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors
in a relevant market in the absence of a license (entities in a “horizontal relationship”). A restraint in a li-
censing arrangement may harm such competition, for example, if it facilitates market division or price fixing.”
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf
3The tension between intellectual property rights and antitrust has long been recognized in the literature.
See, among others, Hovenkamp et al. (2004).
4This is the “derived reward” principle advocated by Maurer and Scotchmer (2006). In the U.S., the
court has long held as patent misuse the extension of one’s monopoly power, facilitated by patent rights, to
the market of unpatented goods via tying (Merges , 1997).
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prohibited. But what if α ∈ (0, 1) and there is uncertainty about the validity and/or
infringement in the case under consideration?5
Intuitively, the market performance under a “reasonable” settlement arrangement
should reflect the underlying case quality: Less competition is more tolerable only
when α is higher. A straightforward solution would be to prohibit settlement and
let the disputing parties and society take the court “lottery,” where monopoly and
unconstrained competition are realized with probability α and 1− α, respectively. The
process toward a court’s decision may involve efficiency loss, however. In addition to
the resources spent in a legal contest, society may be “risk averse” and wish to avoid
uncertainty (Shapiro, 2003). A settlement can improve social welfare by providing
determinacy.
To capitalize on this social benefit, Shapiro (2003) proposes what we shall call the
“Shapiro policy” or the “consumer protection rule”: A settlement is acceptable if “the
proposed settlement generates at least as much surplus for consumers as they would have
enjoyed had the settlement not been reached and the dispute instead been resolved through
litigation.” According to Shapiro (2003), this policy maintains a sound balance be-
tween patent law and antitrust policy, for it fully respects a patent-holder’s rights as
well as Pareto dominates the continuation of the law suit.6 After all, if consumers are
unharmed, why wouldn’t a voluntary settlement benefit the private disputants and
bring Pareto improvement? (To be sure, this assertion requires that no other parties
are affected by the settlement. A generalized version would require no third parties
be harmed by the proposed settlement.)
In this paper, we examine this policy in two environments. First we point out
that the two nice properties asserted by Shapiro (2003) hold only under a “compre-
hensive contracting” assumption, where no player makes strategic moves prior to the
dispute. Suppose that, before engaging in a patent dispute, a potential entrant makes
a unilateral decision whether to incur an entry cost. In this case, his entry decision
depends on what would be gained in a patent dispute, which in turn hinges on the
settlement term permitted by the court. We show that whenever the entrant can get
5Therefore, according to the classification of Hovenkamp et al. (2003), we are concerned with the “third
category” where the court has to look into the validity of the patents or infringement issues involved to
decide the reasonable settlement agreements. However, unlike their analysis, we consider the final market
outcome under settlement rather than particular licensing arrangements such as field-of-use restrictions or
reverse payment.
6Shapiro (2003) also argues that, in practice, DOJ and FTC enforcement actions are consistent with this
policy.
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a share of the settlement surplus, a more lenient settlement agreement will encourage
more entry and widen the range of entry cost over which this cost will be incurred.
The effect is similar to Rasmusen (1988)’s “entry for buyout” story or the occurrence of
“nuisance suits” in the law and economic literature, and would call for a more strin-
gent settlement regulation in order to avoid unwanted strategic entry.7 As we will
see, if the entry cost is large enough, even a very tight policy that prevents any set-
tlements can outperform the Shapiro policy, in terms of both static social welfare and
patentee’s payoff. By deterring costly entry and thus preventing a patent dispute, the
patent-holder maintains the monopoly and society saves on the entry cost. In other
words, raising R&D incentives (by increasing a patent-holder’s payoff) and imposing
restrictive antitrust limits need not be at odds.8
We next turn to an implementation issue of the settlement regulation, namely,
asymmetric information between the court and disputing parties concerning the “case
quality” α, which measures the patent validity and likelihood of infringement.9 This
information, as suggested above, is crucial in constructing a reasonable settlement
policy. However, when deciding whether to grant a “pass,” without injecting signifi-
cant efforts into understanding the underlying technologies, the court may only have
a very vague idea about the “quality” of patent rights involved. The two disputing
parties, by contrast, may gather more information and even reach a consensus about
each other’s winning probability through extensive interactions during the bargain-
ing process. Lacking other means to screen this information, we show that disputants
will agree to settle under the court-regulated terms only when α is low enough, i.e.,
only when the patent is likely to be invalid or not infringed.
In light of this adverse selection issue, we derive an “expectation test” as an exten-
sion of the Shapiro policy under asymmetric information. To ensure that consumer
surplus is at least as large as no settlement at all, this test requires that, if the court
permits a more lenient settlement policy, those settled cases should have a higher
“quality” α in expectation. We also show that in this case consumer protection is not
7See Rasmusen (1998), Daughety (1999), and Spier (2007) for surveys of nuisance suits. Different from
previous studies, in our context we emphasize the effect of the settlement policy on the size of the stake to
initiate a “nuisance suit,” i.e., when the entrant will not incur the entry fee without a settlement.
8Meurer (1989) has also considered settlements between a patentee and a competitor under varying
antitrust limits. Different from our model, his competitor is already in the market, or equivalently, there is
no entry cost.
9The antitrust authority also faces information constraints in merger control (Cosnita and Tropeano,
2006, Rey, 2006) and enforcement against tacit collusion (Besanko and Spulber, 1989).
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compatible with full settlement as long as α = 1 with probability strictly between zero
and one. And in some cases, it may even require no settlement with probability one!
The Shapiro settlement policy may appear stringent in the presence of asymmetric
information.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 3
we consider strategic entry. Asymmetric information is introduced in Section 4 and
we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Model
Two private players, a patent-holder (she) and a potential entrant (he), may engage in
a patent dispute. If so, they may decide to settle the case, and the proposed settlement
agreement has to be approved by the court (or antitrust authority).
The patent-holder is already operating in the market. To enter the market, the
potential entrant has to incur an entry cost f ≥ 0 and clear the legal hurdle created
by the patent-holder’s patent rights. Either the patent-holder may sue the entrant for
patent infringement or the latter may try to invalidate the patent.10 For simplicity,
we do not consider litigation costs.11 When the dispute is resolved in court without a
settlement, let α ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the court finds the entrant infringes on
the patent-holder’s valid patent. Henceforth we shall refer to α as the patent validity.
But it should be understood that it evaluates both validity and infringement issues.
We assume that both f and α are common knowledge between private players. The
court also knows f , but learns the true value of α only in Section 3, but not in Section
4. We also assume away secret settlement, and so any dispute resolution between the
patent-holder and potential entrant is scrutinized by the court.
An unsettled dispute gives rise to either a monopoly or duopoly market. The
patent-holder enjoys monopoly profit pim if the potential entrant does not enter the
market and there is no patent dispute, or, after a legal fight, the court rules in the
patentee’s favor and grants an injunction against the entrant. In this case, the con-
10The two types of lawsuits are equivalent in a two-firm setting, because a patent could block entry only
when it is both valid and infringed. When there are multiple entrants with differentiated products, it may
well happen that only a subset of products infringe the valid patent. In this case, the patent-holder loses
the monopoly but infringing firms won’t be able to enter without the patent-holder’s consent.
11For strategic entry, a positive litigation cost generates no new insights but moves the threshold values
of the entry costs where settlement or market entry occurs. SeeMeurer (1989). For asymmetric information,
see the discussion in Remark 6.
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sumer surplus is denoted by CSm. The static social welfare isWm ≡ CSm + pim, gross
of the entry cost f , if incurred.12
In a duopoly market, where both firms compete in an unconstrained manner, we
assume that the patent-holder gets picP ≥ 0 and the entrant gets pi
c
E ≥ 0 (gross of
entry cost f ), respectively. This applies when the court finds no patent infringement
and the entrant competes with the patent-holder in the market. Denote consumer
surplus as CSc. The static social welfare (gross of entry cost) isWc ≡ CSc + pic, where
pic ≡ picP + pi
c
E. Assume that pi
m ≥ pic ≥ 0, CSc ≥ CSm ≥ 0 andWc ≥Wm.
Instead of waiting for the court to rule, firms frequently settle their patent dis-
putes. Barring secret settlement, however, the parties’ ability to cooperate and realize
higher joint profit is constrained by the settlement terms permitted by the court. For
simplicity, we assume that the court has all the demand and cost information to cal-
culate the performance under different market structures. To fix the idea, let the court
regulate the post-settlement market price p ∈ [pc, pm], where pc and pm is the market
price under duopoly and monopoly, respectively.13 We exclude the structure regula-
tion, e.g., how many firms should be present in the market. In our setting, there is no
loss in giving up this policy instrument.
For instance, under the most stringent regulation, p = pc, firms are allowed at
most a lump-sum transfer in a settlement, with joint profit pic. The court will not al-
low any other licensing terms that would undermine competition, such as price fixing,
quantity restrictions, per-unit royalties, or territory agreements. On the other hand,
under the laxest settlement policy, p = pm, firms have full degree of freedom to con-
struct licensing agreements. In the absence of bargaining frictions such as asymmetric
information, they can jointly realize the monopoly profit with proper mechanisms
and then use fixed payments to divide the joint profit pim. Borrowing from Meurer
(1989), the policy p = pc is called the lump-sum policy, and p = pm the laissez-faire
policy.
We will also pay attention to a settlement policy put forward by Shapiro (2003),
under which settlements are allowed as long as consumers are no worse off than if
the suit continues.
Given a market price p, let CS(p) and pi(p) be the consumer surplus and firms’
12The net social welfare is Wm − f if the entrant did incur f and enter, but then the court rules that he
infringes the patent and so is forced to exit the market.
13The same outcome can be implemented, for instance, by imposing a specific range of royalty rate in
order to achieve the corresponding level of consumer surplus.
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joint profit (gross of entry cost f ), respectively. By convention, assume that dCS/dp <
0 and dpi/dp > 0 for p ∈ [pc, pm]. In other words, a lower p corresponds to a more
stringent settlement regulation. Following Shapiro (2003), we impose the following
assumption on the shape of static social welfare,W(p) ≡ CS(p) + pi(p).
Assumption. W(p) is decreasing and concave in p.
The different impacts of p on W and pi illustrate the fundamental conflicts be-
tween market power and static efficiency; absent this conflict settlement regulation
is not an issue. And the concavity of W(p) captures the social benefit of a settle-
ment to avoid uncertainty. This implies a “risk-averse” social preference: W(αpm +
(1− α)pc) ≥ αWm + (1− α)Wc. That is, society would prefer a deterministic price
p = αpm + (1− α)pc to a “litigation lottery” where monopoly price pm and duopoly
price pc are realized with probability α and 1− α, respectively. The concavity is guar-
anteed by a weakly convex industry-wide cost function and a demand function that
is not “too convex”.14 More importantly, this assumption gives settlements the “ben-
efits of doubt” and works against our position in favor of a stringent antitrust policy.
If the reverse is true, then the concern of static welfare calls for the prohibition of
settlements.15
To characterize the bargaining outcome, we assume that with probability β ∈ [0, 1]
(probability 1 − β), the entrant (the patent-holder, respectively) makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer. The description of the timing will be provided in due course.
3 Strategic Entry and Antitrust Limits
This section considers the effect of strategic entry on settlement policy. Assume that
the court learns the true value of α, which is strictly between zero and one in order to
maintain uncertainty. Let us consider two scenarios, comprehensive contracting and
strategic entry.
14With a industry-wide cost function c(·) and demand function D(p),
dW(p)
dp
= [p− c′(D(p))]D′(p) < 0, and
d2W(p)
dp2
= [p− c′(D(p))]D′′(p) + [1− c′′(D(p))D′(p)]D′(p), (1)
where p > c′(D(p)). d2W/dp2 is negative if c′′ ≥ 0 and D′′ not too large, say, D′′ ≤ 0.
15But to the extent that the two disputing parties can write a contract with random components to mimic
the litigation outcomes, they always (weakly) prefer to settle.
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Figure 1: Timings
Referring to Figure 1, in the case of comprehensive contracting (the upper time
line), the entrant and patent-holder start a patent dispute at time 1 and bargain for
settlement without the former spending the entry cost f . The proposed settlement
agreement will be evaluated by the court at time 2. If the court approves the agree-
ment, the game ends; otherwise the trial continues and the court will make its in-
fringement or validity decision. And at time 3 the entrant decides whether to spend f
and enter if and only if the court clears the patent barrier. In this scenario, entry deci-
sion forms part of the settlement bargaining. That is, the two disputants collectively
decide whether f should be spent in a settlement agreement.
In the case of strategic entry (the lower time line), the entrant can decide unilater-
ally whether to spend f at time 0, before the patent dispute and settlement bargaining.
The game then continues as in the comprehensive contracting case, in particular the
entrant can still wait and decide whether to enter at time 3, until settlement breaks
down and the court rules in his favor. The key difference between the two scenarios
is whether the potential entrant has a strategic move prior to the bargaining stage.
Let us first consider the case of strategic entry. When f ≤ picE, the entrant has a
credible threat to enter after the patent obstacle is cleared at time 3. He doesn’t have
to incur f at time 0 in order to start the suit and engage in bargaining with the patent-
holder; at time 1, the patent-holder will agree to talk with the entrant whether the
latter has spent f or not. And if f is not spent yet, the threat point payoffs at time 1’s
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bargaining are (1− α)(picE − f ) for the entrant and αpi
m + (1− α)picP for the patent-
holder. These are the payoffs when they fail to settle the case. Their joint payoff is
pi(p), where p is the settlement price permitted by the court.16 The two will agree
to settle when pi(p) ≥ αpim + (1− α)(pic − f ), or when S(p) ≡ pi(p) − [αpim + (1−
α)pic] ≥ −(1− α) f . Define p˜ such that S( p˜) ≡ −(1− α) f . There is settlement when
p ≥ p˜.
Suppose that p ≥ p˜. With probability β, the entrant makes a take-it-or-leave-
it settlement offer such that the patent-holder receives her threat point payoff. The
entrant’s payoff is
β {pi(p)− [αpim + (1− α)picP]}+ (1− β)(1− α)(pi
c
E − f )
=(1− α)(picE − f ) + β[S(p) + (1− α) f ],
(2)
and the patent-holder’s payoff is
(1− β) [pi(p)− (1− α)(picE − f )] + β[αpi
m + (1− α)picP]
=αpim + (1− α)picP + (1− β)[S(p) + (1− α) f ].
(3)
The patent-holder’s payoff is increasing in the antitrust policy p. A more lenient pol-
icy increases the bargaining surplus without affecting the occurrence of the dispute.
On the other hand, if f > picE, the entrant won’t be able to get the patent-holder
to the bargaining table without incurring f at time 0, regardless of the permissible
settlement price. Because the potential entrant will not enter even when the patent is
invalidated or there is no infringement, the patent-holder can maintain her monopoly
status in the subgame where f is not spent at time 0.17 But if the entrant spends f at
time 0, this cost becomes sunk at the bargaining stage and the entrant’s threat point
payoff shifts to (1− α)picE. Upon dispute, the two will agree to settle if S(p) ≥ 0, or,
equivalently, if p ≥ pˆ, where pˆ is defined by S( pˆ) ≡ 0.
When p < pˆ and so there is no settlement, the entrant’s payoff is (1− α)picE − f ,
and the patent-holder’s payoff is αpim + (1− α)picP. And when p ≥ pˆ, the entrant’s
payoff becomes
− f + β {pi(p)− [αpim + (1− α)picP]}+ (1− β)(1− α)pi
c
E = (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p)− f , (4)
16They can save on the entry cost and simply implement p because the court does not require entry.
17And any strictly positive litigation cost suffices to discourage the potential entrant from engaging in a
dispute.
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and the patent-holder’s payoff is
(1− β)[pi(p) − (1− α)picE] + β[αpi
m + (1− α)picP] = αpi
m + (1− α)picP + (1− β)S(p). (5)
The entrant will incur f at time 0 if and only if
picE < f ≤ (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p), (6)
which is possible only when βS(p) > αpicE. Without the prospect of a settlement, the
entrant will not spend f and enter in the first place. Since a more lenient antitrust
policy increases S(p), it also enlarges the range of entry cost f that the entrant is
willing to spend in order to solicit a settlement offer. This is similar to Rasmusen
(1988)’s idea of “entry for buyout,” i.e., the entrant spends f not to compete with the
patent-holder, but to reach a settlement and share the surplus.18
Proposition 1. (Strategic entry). Given the settlement policy p, consider different ranges of f
in the strategic entry scenario:
• when f ≤ picE, the occurrence of patent disputes is not affected by the antitrust policy p.
The case settles when p ≥ p˜ and the entrant needs not spend f at time 3; and for p < p˜,
there is no settlement and the entrant incurs f at time 3. The patent-holder’s profit is
increasing in p. Static social welfare is W(p) for p ≥ p˜, and αWm + (1− α)(Wc − f )
otherwise;
• when picE < f ≤ (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p), given that βS(p) > αpi
c
E, the entrant has to
incur f at time 0 in order to have a credible litigation threat at time 1. Static social
welfare is W(p)− f ; and
• when f > (1− α)picE + βS(p), the patent-holder retains the monopoly.
Now we turn to the comprehensive contracting scenario. It is equivalent to elimi-
nate time 0 in the previous game. By Proposition 1, when f ≤ picE the fact that time 0
is not available to the entrant doesn’t affect the analysis. And when f > picE, losing the
ability to make a strategic entry decision renders the patent-holder the monopoly po-
sition. Therefore, under comprehensive contracting the antitrust policy doesn’t affect
the occurrence of a patent dispute. Whenever a dispute happens, the patent-holder
will always prefer a more lenient policy. Upon dispute, the patent-holder’s payoff is
18“Entry for buyout” is by no means confined to the case of single entrant. In the appendix we show that
this result is robust to a case of two potential entrants who decide sequentially whether to incur the entry
cost and initiate the patent litigation (Rasmusen (1988) has considered the case of simultaneous entry).
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αpim + (1− α)picP + (1− β)max{0, S(p) + (1− α) f}, which is increasing in the pol-
icy p; and static social welfare is W(p) for p ≥ p˜, i.e., when there is settlement, and
αWm + (1− α)(Wc − f ) for p < p˜, i.e., when the two parties will not settle.
Concerning static efficiency, total static surplus under laissez-faire policy pm is strictly
less than other policies p ∈ [p˜, pm). This is not surprising because for the policy range
p ∈ [p˜, pm] the two parties will agree to settle, with a static social welfareW(p) strictly
decreasing in p. What is more interesting is when we consider the consumer protec-
tion rule proposed by Shapiro (2003).
Define the Shapiro policy ps by CS(ps) ≡ αCSm + (1− α)CSc. That is, consumer
surplus is the same under this policy as it would be if the suit continues.19 By the
concavity assumption, pi(ps) ≥ αpim + (1− α)pic,20 therefore ps ≥ p˜ and W(ps) ≥
αWm + (1− α)(Wc − f ). Relative to no settlement, Shapiro policy ps does improve
static social welfare. In fact, this is true for any policy p ∈ [p˜, ps] such that it induces
settlement without hurting consumers. Under comprehensive contracting, it is not
optimal to choose a very stringent antitrust policy.
Proposition 2. (Comprehensive contracting). Under the comprehensive contracting environ-
ment, the potential entrant has a credible entry threat, and so the patent dispute will ensue if
and only if f ≤ picE.
When f ≤ picE, the patent-holder always prefers a more lenient antitrust policy; and for
static efficiency, (i) the laissez-faire policy pm is a dominated policy; (ii) any policy p ∈ [p˜, ps]
under which firms are willing to settle while consumers are not harmed Pareto dominates a
stringent policy p′ < p˜ that prevents settlement.
The previous results confirm Shapiro (2003)’s assertion that ps always brings Pareto
improvement under comprehensive contracting environment. However, a compari-
son between the two scenarios shows that it may no longer be true under strategic
entry, when the entry cost falls into the range (picE, (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p)]. In this sense,
when the entry dynamics is included, “comprehensive contracting” is a crucial as-
sumption for Shapiro (2003)’s analysis.
19More generally, the Shapiro policy allows any settlement agreement with consumer surplus no smaller
than CS(ps). But since consumer surplus is decreasing while firms’ joint profit is increasing in the policy
variable p, firms will optimally choose p such that consumers are equally well off with or without the
settlement.
20To see this, suppose that at ps, pi(ps) < αpim + (1 − α)pic, and so W(ps) < αWm + (1 − α)Wc ≤
W(αpm + (1− α)pc), by the concavity ofW. This in turn implies ps > αpm + (1− α)pc. But since CS(p) =∫
∞
p D(t)dt, where D(·) is the demand function, CS
′′(p) = −D′(p) > 0, CS is convex in p. The definition of
ps and convexity of CS lead to ps < αpm + (1− α)pc, a contradiction.
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When the entrant has the opportunity to incur f before the bargaining stage, by
Proposition 1 it will expand the potential entrant’s relevancy. The range of f over
which a patent dispute will occur and the patent-holder will lose her monopoly rent
enlarges to f ≤ (1− α)picE + βS(p). Therefore, under strategic entry the patent-holder
doesn’t always benefit from amore lenient settlement regulation. Rather, she has “lex-
icographic” preferences: A policy that keeps the potential entrant out of the market
serves her interests best; and conditional on entry, a laxer policy is preferable. Be-
cause a lower p reduces bargaining surplus S(p) and is more likely to deter entry,
the patent-holder’s preferences may be non-monotonic in the antitrust policy. When
f ∈ (picE, (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p
s)], by S(pc) < 0 the patent-holder would prefer the most
stringent settlement regulation pc to ps.
Concerning static efficiency, a more lenient antitrust policy encourages the poten-
tial entrant to incur the entry fee at time 0, and so reduces the occurrence of monopoly
outcome. This improvement, however, is achieved at a cost f . Again, comparing ps
with pc for an entry fee f ∈ (picE, (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p
s)], static social welfare is higher
under pc than under ps ifWm > W(ps)− f . (Below we present an example.)
Corollary 1. In the dynamic entry setting, relative to the most stringent policy pc, the Shapiro
policy ps is always friendlier to the patent-holder and improves static efficiency only under the
comprehensive contracting assumption.
To be sure, the analysis here is not to deny the benefit third-party patent challenges
may bring. For instance, when f ≤ picE, antitrust policy has no impact on the occur-
rence of the patent dispute, whatever the entry scenario. When there is settlement,
society benefits from the entrant’s presence: W(p) > Wm so long as p < pm. And
if there is no settlement, a small f also means that static welfare is more likely to be
higher: αWm+(1− α)(Wc− f )−Wm = (1− α)(Wc−Wm− f ). In this regard, a more
efficient entrants (the one with f ≤ picE) should be more welcome than its less efficient
counterpart (the one with f > picE) as socially valuable “private attorney general.”
The following example suggests that the same may hold true when efficiency is mea-
sured in terms of marginal cost. An entrant with higher marginal cost is more likely
to engage in entry for buyout, and so a lenient antitrust policy (such as the Shapiro
policy) may be less likely to improve social welfare21
Example. (Cournot competition). Consider Cournot competition with a liner inverse
market demand p = 1 − bQ. Firms offer homogeneous goods, but have different
21We thank a referee for bringing our attention to this issue.
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marginal costs, which are assumed constant. For simplicity, assume that the paten-
holder has zero marginal cost. The entrant’s marginal cost is 1/2 − e, where e ∈
[0, 1/2]. A higher e then corresponds to a more efficient entrant. Under these as-
sumptions, the monopoly outcome is pm = 1/2, Qm = 1/(2b), pim = 1/(4b), and
CSm = 1/(8b); and the duopoly outcome is
pc =
1
2
−
e
3
, qcP =
1
b
(
1
2
−
e
3
), qcE =
2e
3b
, Qc =
1
b
(
1
2
+
e
3
), and
picP =
1
b
(
1
2
−
e
3
)2, picE =
4e2
9b
, CSc =
1
2b
(
1
2
+
e
3
)2.
(7)
The case of e = 0 corresponds to the monopoly outcome. The entrant’s marginal
cost is equal to the monopoly price; and with zero margin, the entrant will not pro-
duce. When e = 1/2, the entrant is as efficient as the patent-holder, and we have the
standard symmetric Cournot outcome.22
Wewant to find a case where picE < f ≤ (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p
s) andWm > W(ps)− f .
That is, under the Shapiro policy, the entrant will incur the entry cost in order to
induce a settlement, and social welfare is lower than if the entry is deterred, e.g., by
the lump-sum policy (due to no settlement). As an illustration, we set f at the upper
bound level, f = (1− α)picE + βS(p
s). The first condition then requires βS(ps) > αpicE,
and the second condition amounts to
(1− α)(CSc − CSm) < (1− α)(pim − picP)− (1− β)S(p
s). (8)
We look for the values of e such that S(ps) > αpicP and CS
c − CSm < pim − picP. When-
ever they hold, there are values of β sufficiently large such that the original conditions
are satisfied.
The Shapiro policy here is determined by
CS(ps) =
(1− ps)2
2b
≡ αCSm + (1− α)CSc ⇒ ps = 1−
√
1
4
+ (1− α)
e
3
(1+
e
3
). (9)
Since the entrant is less efficient than the patent-holder, in the settlement, the two
firms will jointly decide to implement ps and let the patent-holder serve all the market
22Our purpose here is to show when entry may reduce welfare. If, by contrast, the entrant has lower
marginal cost than the patent-holder, then entry provides an additional benefit of superior production
technology.
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Qs = (1− ps)/b. Settlement outcome is
pi(ps) = psQs =
1
b
{√
1
4
+ (1− α)
e
3
(1+
e
3
)−
[
1
4
+ (1− α)
e
3
(1+
e
3
)
]}
, (10)
and S(ps) =
1
b
[√
1
4
+ (1− α)
e
3
(1+
e
3
)−
1
2
− (1− α)
2e2
3
]
≥ 0. (11)
S(ps) = 0 if and only if e = 1/2 and α = 0.
Provided that the entrant is a relevant competitor, i.e., when e > 0,
S(ps) > αpicE ⇔ (1− α)(1+
e
3
) >
2e
3
(3− α)[1+
2e2
9
(3− α)], (12)
and pim − picP > CS
c − CSm ⇔
1
2
>
e
2
. (13)
Condition (13) is guaranteed by e ≤ 1/2. For condition (12), as long as α < 1, it holds
if and only if e is small enough. We thus conclude that a less efficient entrant is less
likely to bring welfare-improving patent challenges. ‖
Remark 1. (Commitment). In the case of strategic entry, the patent-holder suffers from
the inability to commit to not negotiating with the potential entrant. To overcome this
commitment problem, Rosenberg and Shavell (2006) proposes a simple solution to
give the patent-holder the option to have the court prevent settlements. This option,
however, could help the patent-holder here only when it could be exerted before time
0, i.e., before the potential entrant incurs f and surfaces as a real threat. When the
entrant has spent f and a dispute initiated, the patent-holder would prefer to seize
any profitable settlement opportunity. The “no settlement” option is irrelevant. By
contrast, a stringent settlement rule can complement the patent-holder’s commitment
power and prevent the dispute from arising. ‖
Remark 2. (U.S. patent reform). The U.S. patent law requires that to be eligible to in-
validate a patent in court, a party should either intend to or already have undertaken
an activity carrying a significant possibility of infringement.23 In our model, it cor-
responds to a case where time 3 is eliminated and a patent dispute won’t happen
23 More precisely, a patent can only be challenged in court as an affirmative defense or counterclaim to an
infringement action brought by the patentee, or by a declaratory judgment plaintiff. For the latter venue,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) used to employ a two prong “reasonable apprehension
of imminent suit” test: in order to file a declaratory judgement suit, a potential infringer must (1) show an
explicit threat or other action by the patentee which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity by the declara-
tory judgment plaintiff which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken by the declaratory
judgment plaintiff with the intend to conduct such activity. See Teva Pharma. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395
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without spending the entry fee at time 0. A comparison between this scenario and
the strategic entry case reveals the effect of a policy reform to abolish this standing
requirement.
For f ∈ (picE, (1 − α)pi
c
E + βS(p)], with or without this requirement the entrant
will have to spend f at time 0 in order to gain a credible threat at the bargaining stage.
The policy change will have no effect when entry cost falls into this range.24 But when
f ≤ picE, contrary to the strategic entry scenario, a legal requirement to present in the
market forces the entrant to incur f before the bargaining stage. Therefore, when
entry cost falls in the lower end ( f ≤ picE), opening the court venue will improve
static welfare with the magnitude of f (when p ≥ p˜) or α f (when p < p˜). This result
vindicates U.S. patent reform, although the ex post effect might be modest. ‖
Remark 3. The effect of strategic entry is not limited to the comparison between the
Shapiro policy and lump-sum policy. Suppose that f > picE. Consider two policies p
1
and p2, with p1 > p2 and βS(p1) > αpicE, i.e., the policy p
1 is loose enough so that
the set (picE, (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p
1)] is not empty. Then whether βS(p2) ≷ αpicE, there is a
range of f over which the potential entrant will incur f under p1 but not under p2.25
In this case, due to the entry deterrence effect the patent-holder will prefer p2 to p1.
Similarly, static social welfare may be lower under p1 than under p2, i.e., we may have
Wm > W(p1)− f . ‖
F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir, 2005). This test, in particular the first prong, is criticized by the Supreme Court
in MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). See, in particular, footnote 11 of the decision
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/05-608P.ZO). The CAFC then has switched to the Supreme
Court’s “all the circumstances” test in a series of decisions, e.g., SanDisk v. STMicroelectronics, 480 F.3d
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Teva Pharma. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2007), and Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Tech. Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This stan-
dard lowers the bar to file the declaratory judgement because “reasonable apprehension of suit” is no more
required, instead, the court should consider all the circumstances to decide whether it has the jurisdiction.
Note that in the U.S., anyone can also challenge the validity of the patent in the patent office via the patent
reexamination procedure. However, this approach is seldom taken. Graham et al. (2003) reports that only
0.3% of patents granted between 1991-8 are reexamined and half of the requests are brought by holders of
the patent.
24 This is no longer true when f is divisible and the entrant can split f and incur part of it prior to
bargaining. In this case, another way to interpret the standing requirement is that, in order to initiate a
patent litigation, the entrant has to at least incur a cost f0 ∈ (0, f ]. (We thank a referee for this suggestion.)
In the appendix, we show that, when f > picE, maintaining a high level of standing requirement (a high
f0), may bring a similar benefit of discouraging wasteful entry. For all the other cases, nevertheless, the
standing requirement either is irrelevant or reduces static welfare because the entrant has to spend more
cost to initiate the patent dispute.
25When βS(p2) > αpicE, it requires f ∈ ((1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p
2), (1− α)picE + βS(p
1)]; and when βS(p2) ≤
αpicE, it requires f ∈ (pi
c
E, (1− α)pi
c
E + βS(p
1)], respectively.
14
Remark 4. (Bargaining setting). Our result on strategic entry holds as long as the sur-
plus the potential entrant can extract from bargaining, βS(p), is increasing in the pre-
vailing settlement policy p. For patent disputes, especially infringement suits, it is not
uncommon for the court to grant the patent-holder a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the alleged infringer from using the patented technology (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001).
In this case, the patent-holder would enjoy monopoly profit before an agreement is
reached, or before the court delivers its decision. It would then be problematic to
model this situation with a sequential bargaining model a` la Rubinstein where bar-
gaining can continue forever. The “inside option value” (the payoff stream during the
course of bargaining) for the patent-holder is in fact her maximal payoff and so she
would have every incentive to delay the bargaining process (Binmore et al., 1986).
Alternatively, if we use a sequential bargaining model with exogenous break-
down risk, e.g., at each period the court may exogenously terminate the bargain-
ing in order to prevent exploitation of the preliminary injunction, our bargaining
result is consistent with the Nash bargaining solution approximated as an equilib-
rium outcome of this sequential game when the length of a single bargaining period
approaches to zero. ‖
4 Asymmetric Information Between Settling Parties
and the Court
Patent validity and infringement are complicated and technical issues. Without care-
fully studying the case under dispute, the court may not have an accurate assessment
of each party’s winning probability, captured by α here.26 Because the antitrust pol-
icy proposed by Shapiro (2003) is extremely sensitive to this parameter, an inevitable
26Some courts show reluctance to engage in such assessment. To cite from the District Court in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (2005): “In sum, it is inappropriate for an antitrust court, in
determining the reasonableness of a patent settlement agreement, to conduct an after-the-fact inquiry into the validity
of the underlying patent. Such an inquiry would undermine any certainty for patent litigants seeking to settle their
disputes.. . .Nor is it appropriate to discount the exclusionary power of the patent by any probability that the patent
would have been found invalid.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision and ex-
presses its agreement with the Second Circuit (In re Tamoxifen) and Eleventh Circuit (In re Schering-
Plough) that “in the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court need not consider
the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.” In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-1097, 2008 WL 4570669 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2008,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1097.pdf).
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question is what if the court has to approve settlement with less information about α
than the disputants.27
Suppose that the true α is still common knowledge to the patent-holder and poten-
tial entrant. For simplicity, assume away the entry cost, f = 0, and so strategic entry
is not a concern. Both time sequences in Figure 1 will generate the same result. For the
court, we assume that it doesn’t know the true α. When deciding whether to approve
a settlement, the court believes that α is randomly distributed between [α, α¯] ⊆ [0, 1]
with CDF Λ(·). If no settlement agreement is reached, the case advances to trial and
the court makes its decision according to the true α. For simplicity, assume there is no
litigation cost. (See Remark 6 below for a discussion of litigation costs.)
Lacking further information, the antitrust policy p ∈ [pc, pm] cannot be condi-
tioned on the true α. Without frictions in bargaining, private parties will accept this
settlement term if and only if pi(p) ≥ αpim + (1− α)pic.28 Given p, only those cases
where α is low enough will settle.
Define
CS0 ≡
∫ α¯
α
[αCSm + (1− α)CSc]dΛ(α) (14)
as (ex ante) expected consumer surplus if no settlement is allowed. An ex ante Shapiro
policy p∗ ∈ [pc, pm] then requires that the expected consumer surplus under this pol-
icy is no smaller than CS0. We show that, due to the information deficiency of the
court, the antitrust policy that “keeps consumer whole” may have to be set at a strin-
gent level so that full settlement is not guaranteed, and it may even be so tight that
settlement is prohibited with probability one.
Given p∗, let α∗ ∈ [α, α¯] be the cutoff between settled and unsettled types: for all
α ≤ α∗, pi(p∗) ≥ αpim + (1 − α)pic, and for all α > α∗, pi(p∗) < αpim + (1 − α)pic.
Disputants with α ≤ α∗ will agree to settle under the policy p∗, and with α > α∗
27The court may not know the true α unless the case proceeds to the costly discovery phase and experts
being summoned to analyze in court the underlying patents and/or infringing products. Up to this stage
a big saving a settlement can bring, the litigation cost, has disappeared. On the other hand, the antitrust
authority such as the FTC or the DOJ Antitrust Division may have expertise in estimating market perfor-
mance such as demand and consumer surplus, this experience, however, can hardly carry over to evaluate
patent validity and infringement.
28When pi(p) ≥ αpim + (1− α)pic, the two can use a fixed payment to divide the joint profit pi(p) such
that both parties prefer to settle. And when pi(p) < αpim + (1− α)pic, there is no division of joint profit
pi(p) that can induce both parties to accept the settlement. For all β˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that the entrant gets β˜pi(p)
and the patent-holder gets (1− β˜)pi(p) under settlement, there is no way to satisfy both β˜pi(p) ≥ (1− α)picE
and (1− β˜)pi(p) ≥ αpim + (1− α)picP.
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will proceed to trial. Expected consumer surplus under p∗ is thus
∫ α∗
α
CS(p∗)dΛ +∫ α¯
α∗
[αCSm + (1− α)CSc]dΛ. Shapiro’s criterion requires
∫ α∗
α
CS(p∗)dΛ +
∫ α¯
α∗
[αCSm + (1− α)CSc]dΛ ≥ CS0
⇒CS(p∗)Λ(α∗) ≥
∫ α∗
α
[αCSm + (1− α)CSc]dΛ.
(15)
After a few calculation, this condition can be expressed as an “expectation test:”
E(α|α ≤ α∗) ≥
CSc − CS(p∗)
CSc − CSm
. (16)
To protect consumer the expected quality of the settled case (i.e., the validity of the
disputed patent or the entrant’s infringement probability) should be no smaller than
the ratio of consumer welfare loss under the settlement policy (CSc − CS(p∗)) to that
under monopoly pricing (CSc− CSm). A more lenient policy (p∗ higher) should come
with a higher expected case quality under settlement.
Define p as the market price under which only the type α is willing to settle:
pi(p) ≡ αpim + (1− α)pic.
Proposition 3. (Expectation test). Suppose that the antitrust authority holds the belief that α
is distributed in [α, α¯] with a CDF Λ(·).
• When Pr(α = α¯ = 1) ∈ (0, 1), the ex ante Shapiro policy induces positive litigation
probability.
• If no p∗ > p and the corresponding α∗ can pass the expectation test, then the ex ante
Shapiro policy can only be implemented with litigation probability Pr(α > α), which is
equal to one when Λ is continuous.29
Proof. The second bullet is straightforward. For the first point, when α¯ = 1 > α, any
p∗ < pm will trigger litigation for those α → 1. And if the authority sets p∗ = pm to
ensure full settlement, then condition (16) fails as long as Pr(α = 1) < 1, i.e., as long
as the patent may not be ironclad. Q.E.D.
A factor that may affect the court’s prior assessment about the case quality, Λ, is
the “quality control” exercised by the patent office during patent examination. When
patent examiners carefully scrutinize patent applications, this should boost the confi-
dence on the validity of issued patents and shift the distribution Λ to the right. By the
29In fact, this is true as long as Λ is atomless.
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same token, for those fields without sufficient examination efforts, granted patents
may be invalidated in court (if fully tested) with significant probability. Given cut-
off α∗, worse performance by the patent office decreases the expected patent quality
E(α|α ≤ α∗). It becomes more difficult to pass the expectation test. Antitrust policy
should be more stringent in response to lax quality control at the patent office.
Example. (Symmetric Cournot Competition.) Consider again linear demand p = 1− bQ,
but assume symmetric Cournot competition, i.e., e = 1/2 and so both firms have zero
marginal cost. Also consider uniform distribution with support [α, α¯] ⊆ [0, 1], where
△α ≡ α¯− α > 0. For this class of distributions, CDF is Λ(α) = (α− α)/△α, and so
E(α|α ≤ α∗) = (α∗ + α)/2.
From previous example, given market price p∗ ∈ [1/3, 1/2], consumer surplus
is (1 − p∗)2/(2b), firms’ joint profit is p∗(1 − p∗)/b, and CSm = 1/(8b) as well as
CSc = 2/(9b). The right-hand side of condition (16) is [16 − 36(1− p∗)2]/7, and so
with uniform distribution the condition becomes
α∗ + α
2
≥
16− 36(1− p∗)2
7
⇒ (1− p∗)2 ≥
4
9
−
7
72
(α∗ + α), (17)
where α∗ ∈ [α, α¯] is the cutoff between settled and unsettled types. By indifference
condition, α∗ is determined by
pi(p∗) ≡ α∗
1
4b
+ (1− α∗)
2
9b
⇒ p∗(1− p∗) =
2
9
+
α∗
36
, (18)
or, α∗ = 36p∗(1− p∗)− 8, where p∗ ∈ [1/3, 1/2]. Condition (16), then, requires that
(1− p∗)2 ≥
11
9
−
7
2
p∗(1− p∗)−
7
72
α. (19)
When α = 0, it is easy to verify that the only p∗ ∈ [1/3, 1/2] to satisfy this condition
is p∗ = 1/3 = pc. Only the type α = 0 will accept this competitive price as settlement
term and so the probability of no settlement is Pr .(α > 0) = 1. ‖
Remark 5. (Construction of Shapiro policy). Another interpretation of the asymmetric
information scenario is that, instead of one case with different possible values of α,
there is a continuum of cases with measure one, each with the samemarket conditions
and thus the same CS and pi. The only difference among cases is α, which again has a
distribution function Λ(α) and support [α, α¯]. The court knows only the distribution
Λ, but not the true α of each case.
As previously discussed, when α¯ = 1 the ex ante Shapiro policy must have a α∗ <
α¯. If the settled cases have ameasure larger than zero and α∗ > α, then at α∗ the parties
18
are indifferent between settlement or not, pi(p∗) = α∗pim + (1− α∗)pic. For α∗, the ex
ante policy p∗ is biased toward the consumer, CS(p∗) > α∗CSm + (1− α∗)CSc and
more stringent than the ex post Shapiro policy should the court learns the true type.
Shapiro policy needs to be properly interpreted by taking into account the uncertainty
facing the antitrust authority, but not at the individual case level. ‖
Remark 6. (Litigation costs). As suggested in Meurer (1989), to help the court discern
the true α the disputing parties may need to spend a handsome litigation cost L > 0
to engage in discovery, retaining experts, etc.. Let L be the aggregate litigation cost
incurred by the two parties. It is easy to see that a strictly positive litigation cost
will increase settlement incentives. Given settlement policy p∗, disputants are will-
ing to settle as long as pi(p∗) ≥ αpim + (1− α)pic − L. Or, targeting a cutoff α∗, the
court can implement a lower settlement price p∗∗ than without litigation cost. By
pi(p∗∗) = α∗pim + (1− α∗)pic− L, the policy p∗∗ is decreasing, and thus consumer sur-
plus Λ(α∗)CS(p∗∗) is increasing in L. This gain, however, has to be balanced against
the expected litigation cost [1−Λ(α∗)]L for those unsettled cases. ‖
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined two issues that would affect the proper regulation of
patent settlement, namely, strategic entry and asymmetric information. In the pres-
ence of strategic entry, a more stringent settlement rule may prevent a patent dispute
from arising, and thus maintain the patent-holder’s monopoly. But due to the saving
on entry cost it needs not reduce static social welfare. Concerning the second issue,
our analysis suggests that a settlement policy that takes into account asymmetric in-
formation between the court and settling parties may only appear stringent, in that it
may prohibit settlement with some probability.
It is worth mentioning that, although for most of our analysis we focused on the
consumer protection rule, mainly for its intention to balance between consumer wel-
fare and innovation incentives, we believe that the insights derived in this paper are
applicable when other criteria are used.
To advance our understanding and for better policy construction, future works
should relax several assumptions imposed here. For instance, in our framework of
asymmetric information, the court does not have other policy tools to sort out patent
validity and thus the screening takes a rough binary form, i.e., either settlement or
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litigation. Depending on the industry or technology field, the court might have a
richer set of policy instruments to design different “bundles” of settlement terms and
more effectively elicit the information. It is then interesting and important to consider
industry-specific settlement policy designs.
Future work should also extend to cases where patents serve more roles than pre-
venting entry. In this paper, we’ve taken a very simple market structure with respect
to the disputed patent, namely, a blocking patent covering a market. Although useful
for early-step analysis, it is not the unique role patents serve in the business world.
For instance, in a complex technology industry such as semiconductor or software,
patents are also used as bargaining chips in cross-licensing agreements. Proper settle-
ment regulation may need to respond to these strategic values of patent rights.
Lastly, we’ve excluded secret settlement in themodel, and so any agreement by the
two disputing parties is subject to court approval. Since firms have strong incentives
to escape antitrust scrutiny and engage in secret settlement, future study should relax
this assumption. But to the extent that the antitrust limit sets the threat point of a
secret negotiation, our results concerning the impact of antitrust policy on the patent-
holder’s profit should hold even when secret settlement is allowed.
Appendix: Sequential Entry and Divisible Entry Cost
In this appendix we consider two extensions of strategic entry and show that our
results in Section 3 are robust to these modifications.
 Sequential entry: Suppose that there are two potential entrants, E1 and E2, with
entry cost fi > 0 and bargaining power βi ∈ (0, 1) vis-a`-vis the patent-holder, i ∈
{1, 2}. E1 and E2 sequentially decide whether to challenge the patent-holder’s patent
rights. For simplicity, we consider only disputes over patent validity, e.g., two generic
drug makers challenge a patent covering a block-buster, and let α ∈ (0, 1) denote
the common belief that the patent is valid if contested in court. One successful strike
suffices to invalidate the patent.
Label the negotiation between the patent-holder and E1 (E2) as the first round,
or round one (second round or round two, respectively) bargaining. We keep the
assumption that βi is the probability that an entrant Ei makes the offer to the patent-
holder, and consider a sequential negotiation where: (i) the same antitrust policy p
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applies to both negotiations; (ii) settlement terms are observable to all players; (iii)
there is no renegotiation; in particular, E2 does not negotiation with E1 at the second
round; and (iv) the settlement agreement at the first round void if bargaining breaks
down at the second round. The first three assumptions are made to simplify the anal-
ysis of the bargaining process. We will discuss the forth assumption in Remark 7 at
the end of this extension.
To show that the logic of entry for buyout extends to sequential entry, we restrict
our attention to the case where neither entrant will incur the entry cost without being
sure that settlement will be reached along the equilibrium path. According to the
analysis in Section 3, this corresponds to the requirement that the entry cost is larger
than the competition payoff.30 In the present case, however, we need to specify the
competitions outcome according to whether the patent-holder is competing against
only E1, or only E2, or both. On the other hand, we will assume an antitrust policy p
lenient enough, and so pi(p) large enough, such that a settlement will also be reached,
given that a dispute has been initiated.
Denote the patent-holder’s monopoly payoff the same as before, pim. When there
are only the patent-holder and an entrant Ei competing in the market, denote the
competition payoffs as pidP,i for the patent-holder and pi
d
i for the entrant Ei, i ∈ 1, 2,
where the superscript “d” stands for duopoly. When all three firms compete on the
market, denote the competition payoffs as pitP for the patent-holder and pi
t
i for the
entrant Ei, i ∈ {1, 2}, where the superscript “t” stands for triopoly.
Assume that all the competition payoffs are greater than zero, and that fi > pi
d
i ≥
piti for both i ∈ {1, 2}. The second inequality generally holds, namely, a firm’s profit
decreases as the number of competitors increases. By the first inequality, the patent-
holderwill not take an entrant seriously until the latter incurs the entry cost. Incurring
entry cost, as before, is a strategic move for an entrant to solicit settlement payment;
we consider the strategic entry scenario for both entrants.31
30Recall the analysis in Proposition 1. When the entry cost is smaller than competition payoff, the an-
titrust policy has no bite on the entrant’s decision to initiate the patent challenge.
31For simplicity, we do not explicitly consider the Hatch-Waxman type temporary quasi-monopoly in the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which grants the first challenger a 180-day exclusive period during which
no other generic firms can obtain the approval to market their generic drugs. This is only quasi-monopoly
because the original patent-holder can still sell its own “brand-generic” version. However, when entrants
enter with the sole intention to be bought out, they will want to make sure that settlement agreements will
be signed and competition outcome will no arise. With some modifications so that pidi and pi
t
i reflect the
competitive advantage (or disadvantage) derived from the 180-day quasi-monopoly, we believe that our
results can be applied to this case.
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We want to show that the upper bound of entry cost that an entrant is willing to
incur is increasing in the antitrust policy p. By backward induction, we start with the
bargaining between E2 and the patent-holder in order to analyze E2’s optimal decision
to incur f2. Since E1 will not incur f1 without the expectation of a settlement, we can
ignore the subgame where the patent’s validity has been fully tested in court before
the second round. We need, however, to consider separately whether E1 has incurred
entry cost.
At round two, if E1 did not incur the entry cost before, say, due to a very high f1
(and, by assumption, has lost his chance), then the analysis is exactly the same as the
single-entrant case. E2 will incur f2 for
pid2 < f2 ≤ (1− α)pi
d
2 + β2
[
pi(p)− αpim − (1− α)(pidP,2 + pi
d
2)
]
≡ f ∗∗2 . (20)
If E1 has incurred f1, initiated a patent challenge, and settled with the patent-holder
with a payment b1 (from the patent-holder to E1), then at the second round, the patent-
holder and E2 will take b1 as given. Without renegotiation, the cooperative payoff be-
tween the patent-holder and E2 in a settlement is pi(p) − b1. Since bargaining break-
down voids prior settlement agreements, threat point payoffs are αpim + (1 − α)pitP
for the patent-holder and (1− α)pit2 for E2. Note that triopoly ensues after the suc-
cessful invalidation of the patent, for E1 has already incurred f1. Bargaining surplus
is S2(p, b1) = pi(p)− b1 − [αpi
m + (1− α)(pitP + pi
t
2)].
With probability β2, E2 offers the patent-holder a payoff αpi
m + (1 − α)pitP, and
obtains a payoff pi(p) − b1 − [αpi
m + (1− α)pitP]. With probability 1− β2, the patent-
holder offers E2 the payoff (1 − α)pit2, and obtains a payoff pi(p) − b1 − (1 − α)pi
t
2.
The expected payoffs are (1− α)pit2 + β2S2(p, b1) for E2 and αpi
m + (1− α)pitP + (1−
β2)S2(p, b1) for the patent-holder. E2 will incur f2 when pi
c
2 < f2 ≤ (1 − α)pi
t
2 +
β2S2(p, b1). Fixing b1, a more lenient antitrust policy pwill increase pi(p) and (weakly)
enlarge the range of entry cost E2 is willing to incur. On the other hand, a large enough
payment b1 may deter E2 from initiating the challenge. The choice of b at the first
round may be driven by strategic concerns to deter E2’s entry.
Move back to the first round of negotiation, assuming that E1 has incurred f1. The
threat point payoffs are (1− α)pid1 for E1 and αpi
m + (1− α)pidP,1 for the patent-holder.
The duopoly outcome applies here because, by f2 > pi
d
2 , E2 will not enter when facing
competition for sure. The cooperative payoff, however, depends on whether E2 will
enter later, which in turn depends on the negotiation outcome at the first round, i.e.,
the payment b1.
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With probability β1, E1 makes the offer. The entrant E1 cannot demand more than
bˆ1 ≡ pi(p) − [αpi
m + (1− α)pidP,1], for the patent-holder can always guarantee herself
the threat-point payoff by rejecting the offer and complete the trial. If
S2(p, bˆ1) = (1− α)(pi
d
P,1 − pi
t
P − pi
t
2) ≤ 0, (21)
then bˆ1 suffices to deter E2’s entry. E1 will optimally demand a payment bˆ1 and the
patent-holder will accept with a payoff the same as at the threat point. To reduce the
number of cases to be considered, from now on we shall assume that condition (21)
holds. (This will be the case, for instance, when firms offer homogeneous goods and
engage in Cournot competition with linear demand and zero marginal cost.)32
With probability 1− β1, the patent-holdermakes the offer. Without other concerns,
the patent-holder will offers a payment b∗1 ≡ (1− α)pi
d
1 , i.e., E1’s threat-point payoff.
However, if the antitrust policy is sufficiently lenient, then the bargaining surplus will
be positive at round two,
S2(p, b
∗
1) = pi(p)− αpi
m − (1− α)(pid1 + pi
t
P + pi
t
2) > 0, (23)
and E2 may want to enter. The patent-holder, then, may have an incentive to raise the
payment to E1 in order to deter E2’s entry.
Consider two situations. When the patent-holder chooses b1 = b
∗
1 , the expected
return from entering for E1 is
β1bˆ1 + (1− β1)b
∗
1 = (1− α)pi
d
1 + β1[pi(p)− αpi
m − (1− α)(pidP,1 + pi
d
1)] ≡ f
∗
1 . (24)
E1 will enter when pi
d
1 < f1 ≤ f
∗
1 . Given b
∗
1 , E2 will enter for pi
d
2 < f2 ≤ (1− α)pi
t
2 +
β2S2(p, b∗1) ≡ f
∗
2 . But if f2 > f
∗
2 , E2 will stay off the market after observing b
∗
1 . The
patent-holder needs not to engage in entry deterrence, and will optimally offer b∗1 to
E1 and obtain a payoff pi(p)− b
∗
1 when it’s her turn to make the offer at the first round.
32 If condition (21) is violated, then there is a range of f2 such that E2 will enter following E1’s offer of bˆ1.
For this range of f2, accepting E1’s offer and settle the case is not the end of the story for the patent-holder.
She still has to face the challenge from E2, with an expected payoff
αpim + (1− α)pitP + (1− β)S2(p, bˆ1) = αpi
m + (1− α)pitP + (1− β2)(1− α)(pi
d
P,1 − pi
t
P − pi
t
2)
<αpim + (1− α)pidP,1.
(22)
The patent-holder will reject the offer bˆ1. In response, E1 has to lower the payment, and so will have less
incentives to enter. Note that E1 won’t be able to demand a higher payment in order to deter E2’s entry. To
deter entry, the payment should strictly larger than bˆ1, but then the patent-holder will prefer to litigate and
not settle the case.
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Suppose that pic2 < f ≤ f
∗
2 and so b
∗
1 is not large enough to deter E2’s entry. Of-
fering b∗1 then opens future bargaining with E2; the patent-holder’s expected payoff is
αpim + (1− α)pitP + (1− β2)S2(p, b
∗
1). To deter E2’s entry, the patent-holder needs to
offer b∗1 + D such that f2 ≡ (1− α)pi
t
2 + β2S2(p, b
∗
1 + D).
33 The extra amount is
D = pi(p)− αpim − (1− α)(pid1 + pi
t
P + pi
t
2)−
1
β2
[ f2 − (1− α)pi
t
2] ≥ 0. (25)
The patent-holder’s payoff from offering the entry-deterrencepayment b∗1 +D is pi(p)−
b∗1 − D. Comparing the payoffs, it is optimal to deter E2’s entry when
pi(p)− b∗1 − D > αpi
m + (1− α)pitP + (1− β2)S2(p, b
∗
1)
⇒ f2 > (1− α)pi
t
2 + β2
[
(1− β2)S2(p, b
∗
1)− (1− α)pi
t
2
]
≡ fD2 .
(26)
A lower f2 implies a higher cost to deter E2’s entry, as the payment b
∗
1 + D to E1
becomes larger. Only when f2 ∈ ( fD2 , f
∗
2 ] will it be necessary and profitable for the
patent-holder to deter entry. Note that a higher payment in turn raises E1’s incentive
to enter: expecting an offer b∗1 + D from the patent-holder offers, E1 will incur f1 such
that pic1 < f1 ≤ f
∗
1 + (1− β1)D ≡ f
D
1 , where D is defined as in condition (25).
Equipped with these cut-offs f ∗i , f
D
i , i = 1, 2, and f
∗∗
2 , we can find the entry pat-
terns according to the level of entry cost f1 and f2. From the derivations of different
cut-offs, we’ve known that fD > f ∗1 and f
∗
2 > f
D
2 . In addition, it can be shown that
f ∗∗2 = f
∗
2 + (1− α)
[
(1− β2)(pi
d
2 − pi
t
2) + β2(pi
d
1 + pi
t
P − pi
d
P,2)
]
. (27)
As long as pidP,2 is not too large, then we have f
∗∗
2 > f
∗
2 > f
D
2 . Suppose this is true.
With the additional assumption that f ∗1 > pi
d
1 and f
D
2 > pi
d
2 , we summarize the result
in Figure 2.
Consider different ranges of entry cost f1 and f2. We may find both entrants en-
tering only for f1 ∈ (pi
d
1 , f
∗
1 ] and f2 ∈ (pi
d
2 , f
D
2 ]. By f1 ≤ f
∗
1 , E1 will enter whether
the patent-holder offers the deterrence payment (b∗1 + D) or not. By f2 ≤ f
D
2 , the
patent-holder finds it too costly to deter E2’s entry, and so E2 enters with probability
1− β1, when the patent-holder makes the settlement offer at round one. For all other
cases: when f1 > f
∗
1 , then E1 will not enter without the deterrence payment b
∗
1 + D
from the patent-holder, and so we won’t have both incurring the entry fee; and when
33Assuming that E2 will enter upon indifference, then to deter entry the patent-holder will need to pay
E1 with an amount b
∗
1 + D + ε, with ε > 0 but arbitrarily close to zero. We shall ignore this complication,
but instead assume that the patent-holder will deter if and only if it is strictly profitable to do so, as implied
in condition (26).
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pid1
pid2 f ∗1 f
D
1
f1
fD2
f ∗2
f ∗∗2
E1 and E2
E1
E2
no entry
f2
Figure 2: Multiple entrants
f2 > f
D
2 , either the patent-holder will engage in entry deterrence (for f2 ∈ ( f
D
2 , f
∗
2 ]),
or E2 will not enter as long as E1 has already entered (for f2 > f
∗
2 ). It is also interest-
ing to notice that whether E2 enters may not be monotonic in the entry cost f2. Fix
f1 ∈ ( f
∗
1 , f
D
1 ]. E1 enters if and only if the patent-holder will offer the deterrence pay-
ment, and the latter will do so if and only if f2 lies in the range ( fD2 , f
∗
2 ]. When f2 is
too small ( f2 ∈ (pid2 , f
D
2 ]), the patent-holder will not deter E2 and so only E2, but not
E1, will enter. When f2 is large enough ( f2 ∈ ( f
∗
2 , f
∗∗
2 ]), E2 will not enter when the
patent-holder offers E1 the payment b
∗
1 . The patent-holder does not have to offer the
deterrence payment. But expecting the payment b∗1 , E1 will choose not to enter; only
E2 enters (for f2 ≤ f ∗∗2 ).
For our purpose, nevertheless, it suffices to notice that all the cut-offs are increas-
ing in pi(p) and so in the antitrust policy p. In this sequential entry scenario, a more
lenient policy still raises entrants’ incentive to enter for buyout. In addition, when-
ever condition (21) holds, the cut-off f ∗1 is identical to the corresponding cut-off we’ve
derived in the single-entrant case. Sequential entry, then, will not reduce the extent
of strategic entry. Given the same antitrust policy p, social welfare (weakly) decreases
under sequential entry than under single-entrant due to the extra entry fee incurred
by the additional entrant.34
Remark 7. Suppose that the settlement agreement between at the first round remains
34The failure of condition (21) is relevant only when E2 will enter under the round one payment bˆ1. In
this case, although E1’s entry incentives reduce in expectation of a lower payment (see footnote 32), we’ll
have a simultaneous increase in the cost as the entry fee incurred by E2.
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valid even after the bargaining breakdown at the second round. Then at the bargain-
ing between the patent-holder and E2, the cooperative payoff is still pi(p) − b1, but
the patent-holder’s threat point payoff reduces to αpim + (1− α)pitP − b1. Bargaining
surplus becomes pi(p)− [αpim + (1− α)(pitP + pi
t
2)], not affected by b1. E2’s expected
payoff b2 and thus entry decision are not affected by the bargaining terms in the pre-
vious negotiation. The patent-holder cannot use b1 to deter E2’s entry, and so will
always offer b1 = b
∗
1 when having the opportunity at the first round. The optimal
settlement offer of E1, however, is different.
At the first round, the patent-holder’s threat point payoff is αpim + (1− α)pidP,1, the
same as before, but her cooperative payoff becomes the expected payoff at round two,
namely, αpim + (1− α)pitP + (1− β2)S2(p, b1). To induce acceptance, E1’s offer has to
satisfy
αpim + (1− α)pitP + (1− β2)S2(p, b1) ≥ αpi
m + (1− α)pidP,1
⇒b1 ≤ pi(p)− αpi
m − (1− α)(pitP + pi
t
2)−
1− α
1− β2
(pidP,1− pi
t
P).
(28)
E1’s incentive to entry has to be modified accordingly. But since this upper-bound is
increasing in pi(p), a more lenient p still raises incentives to enter. ‖
Divisible entry cost: Here we assume divisible entry cost and consider an alter-
native construction of the standing requirement discussed in Remark 2. Suppose that,
in order to be eligible to bring a suit to invalidate the patent, the entrant has to incur at
least f0 ∈ (0, f ] of the entry cost. We compare the welfare impact of this requirement
with the case where this requirement is abolished, i.e., when f0 = 0, whose effect has
been analyzed in Proposition 1.
When f0 ≤ f ≤ picE, the standing requirement will alter the settlement behavior,
but not the entrant’s decision to challenge the patent. The entrant is forced to spend
f0 before the settlement negotiation, and so, at bargaining, the entrant’s threat point is
raised to (1− α)[picE − ( f − f0)] while the bargaining surplus reduced to S(p) + (1−
α)( f − f0). Define p˜0 such that S( p˜0) ≡ −(1− α)( f − f0); the two parties will settle if
and only if p ≥ p˜0. It is easy to verify that p˜0 > p˜ for all f0 ∈ (0, f ], i.e., the standing
requirement weakens the two parties’ settlement incentives.
Concerning the welfare effect, when p < p˜ or p ≥ p˜0, the two parties’ settlement
choice is not affected, but static welfare is lower in the presence of the requirement.
This is because the requirement forces the entrant to spend f0 even though in the end
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he does not enter the market. When p < p˜, there is no settlement, and social welfare
is αWm + (1− α)(Wc − f ) without the standing requirement, but reduces to − f0 +
αWm+(1− α)[Wc− ( f − f0)] = αWm+(1− α)(Wc− f )− α f0 under the requirement.
When p ≥ p˜0, the two parties will settle, and social welfare is W(p) without the
standing requirement, butW(p)− f0 under the requirement.
When p˜ ≤ p < p˜0, introducing the standing requirement prevents settlement.
Social welfare is W(p) without the standing requirement, and αWm + (1− α)(Wc −
f ) − α f0 under the standing requirement. Since at the Shapiro policy ps, pi(ps) ≥
αpim + (1− α)pic > pi( p˜0), we must have ps > p˜0 > p. Together with the assump-
tion that W(·) is decreasing in the antitrust policy, we then obtain W(p) > W(ps) >
αWm + (1− α)(Wc − f )− α f0. The standing requirement f0 reduces social welfare.
Suppose that f > picE, and so the entrant does not have a credible entry threat with
the whole entry cost f . To assess the effect of standing requirement f0, we first modify
the analysis in Section 3 so that the entrant can divide the entry fee with or without
the requirement. We show that the optimal expenditure for the entrant to incur at
time 0 is f − picE, for he only needs to incur f − ( f − pi
c
E) = pi
c
E at time 3. Any smaller
expenditure won’t make him credible, and so we only need to establish that it’s not
optimal for the entrant to spend extra money.
Lemma 1. With f > picE but divisible, to obtain a credible entry threat, the potential entrant’s
optimal expenditure at time 0 is f − picE. The entrant’s optimal expected payoff is − f + pi
c
E +
β[S(p) + (1− α)picE], given that S(p) + (1− α)pi
c
E > 0.
Proof. We’ve noted that the minimal expenditure required is f − picE. Suppose that
the entrant spends fˆ ∈ [ f − picE, f ] at time 0, and so pi
c
E ≥ ( f − fˆ ). At the settlement
bargaining, his threat point payoff is (1 − α)[picE − ( f − fˆ )] ≥ 0, and joint surplus
is pi(p) − [αpim + (1− α)picP]− (1− α)[pi
c
E − ( f − fˆ )] = S(p) + (1− α)( f − fˆ ). It is
easy to see that the entrant will not spend fˆ if joint surplus is negative and so there is
no settlement. When there is settlement, given the bargaining power β, the entrant’s
payoff is
− fˆ + (1− α)[picE − ( f − fˆ )] + β
[
S(p) + (1− α)( f − fˆ )
]
. (29)
Since fˆ has negative coefficient, −1+ (1− α)(1− β), the entrant will want to spend
as little as possible; the optimal fˆ = f − picE. Fixing fˆ at this level, and suppose that
the two will settle, we then obtain the entrant’s payoff. Q.E.D.
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This lemma also implies that a low standing requirement f0 ≤ f −picE is irrelevant,
for it will not alter the equilibrium outcome. But with a high standing requirement,
f0 > f − picE, the entrant will have to spend f0 in order to present his case in court.
After this expenditure, his threat point payoff shifts up to (1− α)[picE − ( f − f0)], and
so the bargaining surplus shrinks to S(p) + (1− α)( f − f0). When the antitrust policy
p induces settlement, i.e., when S(p) + (1− α)( f − f0) ≥ 0, the entrant’s payoff is
− f0 + (1− α)[pi
c
E − ( f − f0)] + β [S(p) + (1− α)( f − f0)] , (30)
which is smaller than − f + picE + β[S(p) + (1− α)pi
c
E]. Facing a binding constraint f0,
the potential entrant has less incentives to incur f0 and challenge the patent.
For the welfare effect, when the antitrust policy p is set so high that the entrant
is willing to spend f0, he must also be willing to spend f − picE when the standing
requirement is abolished. Social welfare isW(p)− f0 with the standing requirement,
and W(p) − ( f − picE) without the requirement.
35 Abolishing the requirement saves
the partial entry expenditure. But if p is not too high such that the potential entrant
is willing to spend f − picE, but not f0, then social welfare isW(p)− ( f − pi
c
E) without
the standing requirement, andWm with the standing requirement. A very demanding
standing requirement (a high f0), then, is similar to a stringent antitrust policy and
deters the potential entrant from initiating the patent challenge. We may haveWm ≷
W(p)− ( f − picE).
One may wonder whether the standing requirement could be used as an addi-
tional, or even more effective policy instrument to deter the potential entrant from
incurring wasteful (partial) entry fee. A thorough analysis would need to consider an
entrant with different possible levels of entry costs. When the antitrust policy p can-
not be made contingent on the true entry cost due to, for instance, asymmetric infor-
mation, a very high f0 indeed may provide additional screening function. However,
even in this case, the benefit from enacting a high requirement to deter the entrant
with high entry cost should be weighed against all the additional costs the entrant
has to bear when he has low entry cost. We remain doubtful about the overall wel-
fare benefit of the standing requirement, and leave the joint determination of optimal
antitrust policy and standing requirement for future research.
35The case where the antitrust policy is set so low such that the potential entrant does not want to spend
f − picE renders the standing requirement irrelevant.
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